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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Training

SUBJECT : Possible Reasons for Failure to Make Maximum Use
of OTR Facilities with Recommendations

On 20 August I attended a meeting of the Division Training Officers. At this meeting a factor was brought out which verified an impression I have had for some time. It is apparent that steps are being taken which will make it mandatory that the Clandestine Services send personnel to the various courses conducted by the Office of Training. Although I realize this is more or less a last-resort measure and that OTR should be commended for continually striving to fulfill its responsibility, I feel that before the Clandestine Services are forced to produce trainees, certain pertinent factors should be examined with a view toward determining the possible reasons for lack of enrollment in many courses offered by OTR. This paper is my attempt to analyze the situation.

My experience has been that force often causes resentment, and the establishment of a quota system could result in (1) certain lower GS rated individuals becoming "professional students" by being entered in all courses, (2) an indiscriminant selection of courses, (3) furnishing of only the absolute minimum to meet quota, and (4) ill feeling between Clandestine Services and OTR.

It is essential that every effort be made to develop a team spirit between OTR and the Clandestine Services. It is only with the closest liaison between OTR and the area divisions that this Agency can hope to develop personnel trained to accomplish efficiently the myriad of tasks placed upon it. Although our relations with the operating divisions have improved steadily over the past three years, it is clear that maximum use is still not being made of the training materials and facilities available within CIA.

As a member of OTR I feel it my duty to offer suggestions which may tend to improve the training picture. Following are personal suppositions, with brief discussions of each, which could be possible reasons why the Clandestine Services are not making maximum use of OTR courses.

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1. TRAINING OFFERED MAY BE INADEQUATE

a. May fail to meet operational requirements. Training courses must be designed to fulfill present-day operational needs as well as future needs. Instruction must be as realistic as possible. Only close and continual liaison between the pertinent operating sections and OTR instructor personnel can assure this requirement. In the near future I will present my recommendations for improving liaison between OTR instructors and the Clandestine Services.

b. Presentation of instruction may be inadequate. A well designed, up-to-date and factual course is ineffective if the material is presented inadequately. Not only should chief instructors work closely with each of their instructors, but frequent visits should be made to all courses by OTR supervisory personnel in order to insure a highly efficient instructor staff.

c. Courses may merely familiarize rather than qualify. Wherever possible courses should be of such design and of sufficient length to qualify the student in a particular field. If familiarization only is accomplished, it is quite possible that supervisory personnel of the operating divisions may favor training their personnel within their own sections.

d. Publicity for training courses offered may be inadequate.

(1) The OTR Catalog of Courses is an admirable step in this direction. The question is, how many individuals are acquainted with this publication and are these catalogs readily available within the divisions.

(2) Weekly meetings with the TLO's are also a step in the right direction, but the question arises here as to how familiar the TLO's are personally with the courses presented. Can they adequately advise prospective students on a proposed training curricula without first-hand knowledge of the material presented? Perhaps OTR branch chiefs or chief instructors should be offered the opportunity to attend weekly TLO meetings in order to discuss thoroughly their individual courses. The capsule presentations can do much to correct this condition.

In my present position I consider it my responsibility to examine each course [REDACTED] and to insure that the training and instruction offered is adequate in subject matter and presented effectively.

So much for the training side of the problem. The following are personal suppositions concerning the Clandestine Services' failure to provide trainees.

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2. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR LACK OF COOPERATION BY THE CLANDESTINE SERVICES

a. Failure of supervisors to demand qualified personnel: Although reasonable for a supervisor to require his GS-4 clerk-steno to be capable of typing, taking dictation, filing, etc., apparently the same supervisor does not require his GS-11's, 12's and higher to be trained to carry out their assignments. I am quite certain that the United States does not have an adequate supply of experienced case officers to fulfill all intelligence requirements. Adequate training is the only substitute for actual experience.

b. Improper attitude toward training. The correct attitude of supervisors and students should be that the student is undergoing training for the purpose of gaining knowledge in order to increase his effectiveness and ability to perform his work. I have the distinct impression that many Agency employees feel that training is merely a period of intense pressure designed primarily to furnish a means of assessment. OTR must correct this impression.

c. Unable to spare individual for training. The major reason offered for not sending an individual to training is that the work load on the job prohibits his release. In many cases it appears this reason is being used as a subterfuge to avoid training. I believe the old adage "no one is indispensable" to be true. As a supervisor myself, I would much rather have a well-trained individual, even if it meant sparing him from the job for a month or so.

It is quite possible that lack of training is a primary reason for the apparently overwhelming work load, as an untrained, inexperienced person nearly always takes excessive time to accomplish a job. In determining whether or not an individual can be spared for training the end results must be considered. Even though training may consume six months away from the job, if the individual accomplishes more in the remaining 1½ years (of a 2 year tour) than an untrained individual on the job for the entire 2 year period, the time in training has been well spent.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS

Following are personal recommendations which, if adopted, will not only provide OTR with sufficient trainees, but will also increase the efficiency of the entire Agency. (The case officer is considered as the basic individual in this organization.) Although these recommendations may appear also as forcing measures, it is felt that they would not be interpreted as such when announced by regulations.

a. Case Officer training prior to entrance on the job. It is recommended that the following training be required when:

(1) The specific assignment for the individual is known both at headquarters and the field.

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- (a) Completion of Phases I, II, and III.
- (b) Completion of those specialized courses having direct bearing on assignment. OTR should be consulted in determining necessary courses.
- (2) Specific assignment has not been determined:
 - (a) Completion of Phases I, II, and III.
 - (b) Completion of all specialized courses.
- (3) Advantages to be gained from the preceding recommendations:
 - (a) Individual would not have to be taken away from the job for training after assignment.
 - (b) Individual's aptitude can be assessed prior to assignment.
 - (c) Individual will have a firm basic understanding and working knowledge of various subjects. This will enable him to cope with any requirement placed upon him.
 - (d) Supervisors can count on this common basic knowledge in the same way that a commander can depend on a graduate of the U. S. Military or Naval Academy to be well grounded in fundamentals. Consequently, the person would be capable of undertaking varied assignments as demanded by the field situation.

b. Training for supervisory positions. Effective utilization of case officers can be attained only if their supervisors are aware of the knowledge and skills they possess as a result of training. It is recommended, therefore, that regulations be established, after appropriate study, which specify the completion of certain training courses as prerequisites for various important supervisory positions. The higher the position, the more training or experience should be required.

In conclusion, may I say that this memorandum is based solely on personal observations and impressions, together with a desire to improve the training picture. If the points presented in this memo offer any constructive food for thought whatsoever, it will have accomplished its purpose. I firmly believe that an attitude can be developed within this Agency whereby all personnel will appreciate the importance of training and OTR will be regarded as an indispensable portion of the CI team.

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